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The Concept of Mind

The Concept of Mind

Gilbert Ryle
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First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics
of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a 'sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work' on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called 'the ghost in the machine': Descartes' argument that mind and body are two separate entities. 

As well as rejecting dualism about the mind, Ryle goes much further, arguing
that more recent materialist or functionalist theories of mind do not solve the Cartesian puzzle either and even accept some of its fundamental, mistaken, propositions. It is because of these mistaken propositions that associated problems, such as mental causation and 'other minds', arise in the first place. 

Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the
will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between 'knowing how and knowing that', challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary philosophy. 

A classic work of philosophy, The Concept of Mind is essential reading for
anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney. Together with the reissue of both volumes of Ryle’s Collected Papers, it provides essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today. 

Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) was a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church College
Oxford and in 1945 was elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy; a position he held until his retirement in 1968. He was Editor of the journal Mind for almost twenty-five years. 

Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Kent, and has
held visiting positions at the Universities of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.

年:
2009
出版:
60th Anniversary Edition
出版社:
Routledge
语言:
english
页:
314
文件:
PDF, 1.53 MB
IPFS:
CID , CID Blake2b
english, 2009
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